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Abstract 
This paper considers different approaches to measuring gender. It critically reviews gender role 
theorising and describes how this has informed two approaches to measuring gender as an 
individual phenomenon: gender orientation (the assessment of individual traits) and gender 
ideology (assessing individual endorsement, and internalisation, of social norms). It is argued here 
that social constructionist perspectives offer a viable alternative to gender role theory and that these 
inform an alternative approach to measuring gender as a social phenomenon: gender 
(re)presentation. This approach assesses group level endorsement of dominant gender 
representations.  Endorsement is not seen to reflect individual traits or internalised social norms. 
Rather, it is understood as a social practice, made meaningful through shared understanding of 
dominant gender representation. This approach is introduced through critique of the traditional 
concept of attitudes and a reformulation thereof. The practical measurement implications and 
benefit of this reformulation are outlined.  
 
Keywords: gender ideology; gender orientation; gender representation; gender role; social 
constructionism.  
Introduction 
Attempts to measure gender have paralleled theoretical shifts in its understanding. This body 
of work is arguably most often associated with Psychology due to its longstanding and well 
established interest in the quantitative assessment of individual differences (Coaley 2009). 
This paper reviews gender theorising and demonstrates how psychological perspectives 
underpinning gender role theory have informed two approaches to measuring gender as an 
individual phenomenon: gender orientation and gender ideology (see Thompson and Pleck 
1995). Description of gender role theory as well as these approaches to measuring gender is 
not new. Yet an explicit link between theoretical and measurement literatures has yet to be 
drawn. This discussion is then extended by introducing a novel approach to measuring gender 
as a social phenomenon: gender (re)presentation. This is informed by theoretical shifts 
associated with social constructionism. The practical measurement implications and benefit 
of this approach are also outlined. Its central claim, that gender should only be measured at a 
social level, signifies a radical departure from established psychological thinking. It offers the 
potential that gender measurement, customarily the methodological preserve of psychological 
research, and its benefits, such as providing large-group normative data, may appeal to those 
working outside the confines of traditional Psychology. Here gender is more readily 
understood as a social as opposed to an individual level phenomenon. 
Many gender-related measures are available. These operationalise an array of 
constructs. Beere (1990a, 1990b), for example, categorises 18 types of gender-related 
measures. The most recognisable include those assessing ‘gender roles’ [such as the Bem 
Sex-Role Inventory (BRSI) (Bem 1974)]; ‘stereotypes’ [such as the Beliefs About Women 
Scale (BAWS) (Belk and Snell 1986)]; ‘attitudes toward gender roles’ [such as the 
Ambivalence toward Men Inventory (AMI) (Glick and Fiske 1999)].  This paper critically 
considers measures operationalising the constructs of ‘gender roles’ and ‘attitudes toward 
gender roles’. The prominence of these constructs in literature justifies their critical 
examination. This is illustrated well through a key word search of the terms ‘gender role’or 
‘sex role’ using the literature datebase PsycINFO. These terms appeared in  4,292 peer 
reviewed journal articles at the time of writing. This paper therefore does not seek to offer an 
all-encompassing overview of gender-related measures and associated theory. There are 
better texts for this purpose (see Beere 1990a, 1990b). Rather it focusses upon and 
interrogates a concept – gender roles – that has featured significantly in the psychological 
measurement of gender. 
Theoretical rationale of measuring gender as an individual phenomenon  
Until relatively recently the majority of research concerning gender has been informed by 
gender role theory (Connell 1992). Gender role theories are often referred to in the singular; 
as is seen in the term ‘gender role theory’. These suggest gender roles exist as a group of 
attributes considered appropriate for one sex rather than the other (Constantinople 1979). 
They describe processes of sex-typing through which an individual acquires these attributes 
(Mischel 1966) and develops a related gender role identity (Garnets and Pleck 1979). 
 However the term ‘gender role theory’ fails to reflect the often substantial differences 
between theories. These concern both the processes by which an individual acquires sex-
typed characteristics as well as assumptions concerning the ontology of gender (Roopnarine 
and Mounts 1987). Differences among theories risks rendering the term ‘gender role theory’ a 
misnomer. A more subtle categorisation of theories is possible. In the account that follows, 
older perspectives of gender role acquisition are described as belonging to the gender role 
identity paradigm, as originally suggested by Pleck (1976), whilst more recent perspectives 
of gender role acquisition are said to represent the gender role beliefs paradigm [originally 
described by Pleck (1981) as the gender role strain paradigm]. 
The gender role identity paradigm includes some of the most well-known 
psychological explanations of gender (Pleck 1987). However, few authors have attempted to 
provide a systematic overview of this. Its review is difficult. Theories belonging to it have 
been modified, and others added, so as to accommodate problems in earlier theoretical 
formulations (Pleck 1981). Nevertheless three theoretical perspectives stand out in their 
contribution: classical psychoanalytic (such as Freud 1905/2000); (cognitive) social learning 
(such as Bandura 1977); and developmental (such as Kohlberg 1966). To a greater or lesser 
extent, each of these perspectives suggests that individuals have an inner psychological need 
to affirm their biological sex through the acquisition of sex-typed characteristics. It is 
believed a female who acquires male sex-typed characteristics will develop an inappropriate 
gender role identity and vice versa. This is considered dysfunctional and is thought to result 
in negative psychological and social consequences (Pleck 1976, 1981, 1987). It is seen 
clearly in, for example, classical psychoanalytic theory where failure to resolve the Oedipal 
and Electra complex can result in neuroses (Roopnarine and Mounts 1987). 
The gender role beliefs paradigm may be distinguished from the gender role identity 
paradigm. This distinction captures the major theoretical shifts having taken place in gender 
role theorising (Pleck 1995). These shifts were in large part due to critique concerning the 
assumption that biological sex determines which gender role identity is ‘appropriate’ and 
functional (Pleck 1981). Information processing perspectives (such as Bem 1981a, 1981b, 
Martin and Halverson 1981) illustrate these shifts. Theoretical perspectives that share the 
assumptions of the gender role beliefs paradigm, argue that males and females experience 
external social pressure to achieve gender-related social norms. Individuals evaluate 
themselves, and others, against these norms during gender role acquisition. They are 
motivated to do so in order to avoid negative social consequences (Pleck 1981). This is well 
illustrated by, for example, Bem’s (1981a, 1981b) gender role schema theory where 
prevailing societal definitions of gender determine the content of the gender schema which in 
turn helps guide individual perception and organises self-concept. 
The theoretical assumptions underlying the gender role identity and beliefs paradigms 
are clearly distinguishable in the measurement of gender as an individual phenomenon.  
Constantinople (1973) is credited as providing an early and seminal critique of existing 
measures (Williams and Best 1990a). However, it was only later that Thompson and Pleck 
(1986) suggested that limitations primarily resulted from an inconsistent understanding and 
measurement of gender as either individual traits or social norms. Others have suggested 
similar distinctions (such as Williams and Best 1990a, 1990b). 
Trait approaches are largely grounded in the gender role identity paradigm. It is 
suggested that masculinity and femininity exist as a configuration of static individual 
attributes. Self-concept ratings on paper-and-pencil questionnaires or scales are understood to 
reflect real differences between men and women. Studies predominantly seek to account for 
the acquisition and consequences of sex-typed characteristics through behavioural and 
personality correlates (Thompson and Pleck 1995). Accordingly masculinity and femininity 
are defined as ‘relatively enduring traits which are more or less rooted in anatomy, 
physiology’ or ‘early experience, and which generally serve to distinguish males from 
females in appearance, attitudes, and behaviour’ (Constantinople 1973, p. 390). 
Alternatively normative approaches suggest gender is socio-culturally defined. These 
are typified by explanations offered by the gender role beliefs paradigm. The fact gender role 
theory informs both trait and normative approaches may appear confusing. The assumption 
embedded in the gender role beliefs paradigm, that gender is determined through social 
norms but ultimately internalised by the individual as relatively enduring traits, results in this 
confusion. Greater emphasis is placed on the contextual specificity of gender. This challenges 
the unexamined assumption that an individual’s gender remains relatively static. However the 
assumption that gender-related social norms are internalised is not questioned. Thompson et 
al. (1992) argue that until recently literature has not distinguished clearly enough between 
trait and normative approaches This is reflected in the theoretical confusion of many 
measures that include, to varying degrees, the assumptions of both.  
In sum, it is argued that although the development of gender-related measures has 
largely proceeded in an a-theoretical fashion (Hoffman 2001), the assumptions of gender role 
theory are implicit within their design. So too are positivist epistemological assumptions 
where measures seek “to produce ‘factual’ knowledge about an objectively present, and so 
observable and measurable, external world”, and one might add, through behavioural 
inference, the internal world (Wilkinson 2001, p. 18). 
A more subtle theoretical distinction can be made between the gender role identity 
and beliefs paradigms. The former has informed the measurement of gender identity as an 
individual trait whilst the latter has suggested the measurement of gender attitudes as 
individually endorsed and internalised social norms. These different measurement approaches 
have been defined as gender orientation and ideology approaches respectively. The 
distinction has met with some resistance (Thompson and Pleck 1995). Nevertheless it holds 
advantages in that it informs appropriate research-specific use of instruments and aids in the 
construction of new theoretically sound measures. In addition evidence exists that 
instruments of gender orientation and ideology measure independent constructs and have 
differential correlates (Thompson et al. 1992). These two concepts are discussed below. This 
provides an overview of the fundamental and changing theoretical assumptions guiding 
gender measurement over the last 70 years. It also provides a critical foundation upon which 
to consider how social constructionism may inform a gender (re)presentation approach to 
measurement. 
The ‘gender orientation’ approach to measurement 
The early measurement of masculinity-femininity (M-F) [such as Attitude Interest Analysis 
Test (Terman and Miles 1936)] was based on four key assumptions, overlapping with many 
of those espoused by the gender role identity paradigm, and arguing that gender was: a static 
individual attribute; not directly observable through overt behaviour; innate to individuals 
and as such a determinant of their mental health; and existing on a bipolar1 and 
unidimensional2 continuum defined by socio-cultural stereotypes of masculinity and 
femininity (Morawski 1987). Thus individuals were assessed along a  continuum, ranging 
from masculine to feminine at each extreme, in order to determine their sex-typing. Gender 
was considered something individuals had, either psychologically or biologically, and this 
was judged appropriate depending upon whether it matched their biological sex. As such non-
normative gender traits (such as a woman who appeared ‘masculine’) were considered 
maladaptive (Windle 1987). Hoffman (2001) suggests that this conceptualisation served as 
the basis for M-F measurement over subsequent decades. 
It was only in the mid-1970s that a well-developed critique of traditional gender 
theory emerged – contributing toward the gender role identity paradigm and related 
measurement (Williams and Best 1990a). Critique revolved around three major issues.  
Firstly it was claimed gender did not exist as a bipolar construct. Critics argued that 
masculinity and femininity should not be considered mutually exclusive. That is to say ‘what 
it is to be a man’ is not related in linear opposition to ‘what it is to be a woman’. Rather the 
constructs were said to operate independently of each other – although often in systematic 
1 A unipolar continuum contains numerical scores that extend in one direction and are 
interpreted in terms of a single end point. A bipolar continuum contains numerical scores that 
extend in two directions and are interpreted in terms of opposite end points (Lavrakas 2008). 
 
2 A unidimensional continuum assesses a construct through interpreting numerical scores on a 
single measure. A multidimensional continuum assesses a construct through interpreting 
numerical scores on two or more measures (Rust and Golombok 2009). 
 
                                                 
opposition (Morawski 1987). Empirical evidence surfaced that undercut the notion of 
bipolarity in gender measurement. For example, findings indicate a positive rather than a 
negative relationship between the correlates of masculinity and femininity (Constantinople 
1973). Secondly the supposed unidimensionality of the M-F construct was said to be overly 
simplistic. This assumption was most obvious in its measurement as a single score (Morawski 
1987). Evidence has been presented to substantiate its multidimensionality through a plethora 
of correlational as well as factor analytic studies.3  Accordingly it is argued that M-F may 
best be assessed through a number of sub-scores (Constantinople 1973). Lastly scepticism 
surrounded both the empirical and theoretical foundation of existing M-F measurement. The 
most common means of measurement construction was to administer a large pool of items to 
participants. Sex-based differences in response served as a means of item selection 
(Morawski 1987); for example, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) 
Masculinity-Femininity Scale (Mf) (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943). This method4 was clearly 
rooted in the widely held view that masculinity and femininity reflected a basic biological 
dimorphism. This view became increasingly untenable along with the realisation that gender 
was not so easily categorised (Williams 1987). As such critics argued that the empirical 
3 Whilst different M-F measures share variance, indicating that they have something in 
common, they are not entirely comparable. It would be fair to expect relatively strong 
correlations to emerge between M-F measures should they be assessing the same construct – 
particularly given their high individual reliability (Constantinople 1973). Yet these 
correlations remain modest at best. These findings are strengthened by results indicating that 
correlations between measures are considerably lower than their individual reliabilities 
(Williams and Best 1990a). Factor analytic studies of M-F measures, which seek to determine 
their main underlying conceptual structure through simplifying data,  also question the 
unidimensionality of the M-F construct (such as Ratliff and Conley 1981). 
4 This method of measurement construction is often referred to as criterion-keying. It 
involves selecting items that correlate to a relevant criterion variable. It is a purely empirical 
approach as there is no underlying conceptual or theoretical rationale to measurement 
construction. It is only interested in identifying items that can discriminate between 
predefined groups. Items demonstrating a weak relationship to the relevant criterion variable 
are dropped. These measures may contain items that contain little meaningful relationship to 
the criterion (Coaley 2009). 
                                                 
foundation of M-F measurement often relied on a false equation between psychological 
gender and biological sex (Constantinople 1973).  
Theoretical critique focused specifically on the rigidity of gender conceptualisation 
and its subsequent measurement. Psychological gender was understood as encompassing a set 
of stable and universal traits. These were seemingly uninfluenced by individual agency as 
well as social factors. That is to say, this understanding overlooked the notion of agentic self-
concept in which individuals actively contribute toward the development of their own unique 
sense of gender self. Similarly, the role played by socio-cultural factors in defining gender 
categories differently over time and context was ignored. Thus, whilst the use of standard M-
F measures in assessing supposedly static gender traits may have seemed reasonable 
(Hoffman 2001), recognition that all measures find production within a unique socio-cultural 
moment was absent. Their use persisted despite obvious variation in item content from one 
measure to another (Constantinople 1973). 
The failure to appreciate the impact of individual agency and social factors in 
determining psychological gender held negative consequences. Constantinople (1973) notes 
that in its insistence that the M-F construct included a set of fixed individual traits, deemed 
‘healthy’ dependent upon an individual’s biological sex, gender measurement was guilty of 
casting the non-normative as abnormal.  
Theoretical critique therefore encouraged the re-assessment of existing measures. 
Researchers took the criticism that M-F did not exist as a bipolar construct seriously; as is 
evidenced in the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (Bem 1974) where individuals were identified as 
one of four types: ‘masculine’; ‘feminine’; ‘androgynous’ or ‘undifferentiated’. Recognition 
that masculinity and femininity were independent constructs held important implications on 
both a methodological and theoretical level. Methodologically, this indicated that gender 
could no longer be measured along a continuum in which a single score determined an 
individual’s sex-typing. Theoretically, it implied that healthy men and women could possess 
cross-gender traits, and even went so far as to suggest the developmentally restrictive nature 
of traditional gender roles. As such psychological gender was no longer understood as related 
to biological sex. The concept of androgyny captured this new awareness. Crucially, 
however, the issue of construct multidimensionality remained unexplored (Windle 1987). 
Yet by the mid-1980s theorising increasingly attacked what was perceived as an 
overly rigid portrayal of gender experience (Morawski 1987). Existing gender role 
explanations were said to neglect its contextual specificity through their emphasis on static 
individual traits. In disregarding the pivotal role played by socio-cultural factors, these 
explanations were argued to adopt an apolitical outlook, which effectively ignored the impact 
power relations play in both compliance with, and endorsement of, social norms (Thompson 
et al. 1992). Morawski (1987) notes, however, that despite these criticisms the question of 
social power continues to remain largely absent from trait approaches. Indeed these 
approaches, which find root in a completely different ontological paradigm from those 
acknowledging the relationship between power and representation, may not easily be open to 
such change. It is worth considering Constantinople’s (1973) early observation that 
weaknesses in gender orientation measurement may not only reside in the method of 
measurement but in the utility of the construct they assess – gender as a static individual 
attribute. 
It is also necessary to acknowledge the inherent cultural bias of gender orientation 
measurement (Williams and Best 1990a). This arises due to the use of gender role stereotypes 
in guiding item construction. Numerous authors have questioned whether these successfully 
capture what it is to be masculine and feminine (Morawski 1987). Nevertheless continued 
dependence on gender role stereotypes limits the valid use of these measures to a specific 
socio-cultural context. 
The ‘gender ideology’ approach to measurement 
From the mid-1980s onward, trait approaches to measurement met with increasing criticism. 
The normative approach was offered as a feasible alternative. Gender is described as a socio-
cultural product rather than a (near) static individual attribute. An individual’s endorsement 
of traditional gender norms is thought to vary across context and time. This accounts 
somewhat for inconsistency and contradiction in individual attitudes toward gender (Levant 
et al. 1992, Levant, Wu and Fischer 1996). The notion that gender exists as a socio-cultural 
product holds far reaching implications for quantitative measurement, not least of which, the 
suitability of techniques that arguably objectify, and hence potentially reify gender, as well as 
universalis related experience.  
The term gender ideology is used to describe individual attitudes toward gender-
related social norms (Levant 1996). Measures of gender ideology are described as assessing 
individual ‘endorsement and internalisation of cultural belief systems about masculinity 
(femininity) and male (female) gender, rooted in the structural relationship between the two 
sexes’ (Pleck 1995, p. 19). These definitions reflect the underlying assumptions of the gender 
role beliefs paradigm where gender is determined through social norms but ultimately 
internalised by individuals.  
Measures of gender ideology consider the constructs of masculinity and femininity as 
multidimensional and independent. Multidimensionality suggests the need to assess support 
for dominant norms rather than a single masculinity or femininity script. Individual 
endorsement of these is seen to vary over context and time as well as across age; culture; 
sexual orientation; social class; and ‘race’ (Levant and Majors 1997, Levant and Fischer 
1998). In addition the assumed independence of masculinity and femininity requires that 
attitudes toward these constructs are assessed apart. Accordingly individuals are assessed 
along a continuum in order to determine their endorsement of independent and multiple 
masculine and/or feminine norms. 
However a lack of systematic theoretical focus has resulted in a number of 
weaknesses in many instruments. It is argued, for instance, that measures of gender ideology 
ought to incorporate three key characteristics: an emphasis on multiple masculinities or 
femininities (construct multidimensionality); a clear distinction between masculinity, 
femininity, and gender ideologies (construct independence); and theoretically appropriate 
content in measuring ideology (Thompson et al. 1992, Thompson and Pleck 1995). 
Understanding that masculinity and femininity are multidimensional constructs 
provides a more sophisticated means with which to explore subtle socio-cultural variation in 
gender conceptualisation. It accounts for differential endorsement of gender norms, at an 
individual or group level, across dimensions. For example, empirical studies using the Male 
Role Norms Inventory (Levant et al., 1992) have found variable support for masculine norms 
along gender (Levant & Majors, 1997; Levant, Majors & Kelley, 1998; Levant et al., 1996); 
‘race’ (Levant & Majors, 1997); and cultural lines (Levant et al., 1996). Findings even 
suggest urban-rural variation (Levant, et al., 1998). The complexity of masculinity and 
femininity ideology is easily understood once interactions between these mediating variables 
are considered. 
It is also recognised that attitudes toward masculinity, femininity and gender do not 
constitute a homogenous set of beliefs. That is to say, men and women’s experiences differ 
due to dissimilar life opportunities (Thompson et al. 1992). Stress is therefore placed on 
absolute gender characteristics. These typify either masculinity or femininity, but do not 
necessarily differentiate between the two, as relative characteristics would (Levant et al. 
1992). This implies that attitudes toward men are not systematically related to those held of 
women or gender relations in general. Whilst these constructs are likely to be empirically 
correlated, their independence is demonstrated through their differing correlation to 
theoretically distinct constructs, or other meaningful variables. Measures of masculinity or 
femininity ideology that fail to appreciate this independence often include gender 
comparative items. This is argued to incorrectly assess gender ideology; that is to say, 
attitudes toward gender relations (Pleck 1981, Thompson et al. 1992). 
Finally, it is argued that measures of gender ideology need to include appropriate 
content. Thompson and Pleck (1995) suggest that third person statements are most beneficial 
in evaluating ideology, whereas the use of the first person may better assess gender 
orientation. Apparent inconsistent use of the third person in gender ideology measures is 
evident in Tolman and Porche’s (2000) Adolescent Femininity Ideology Scale which is 
written in the first person whilst Chu, Porche, and Tolman’s (2005) Adolescent Masculinity 
Ideology in Relationships Scale is written in the third person. A distinction has also been made 
between descriptive stereotypes (that is, ‘what men or women are like’) and prescriptive 
norms (‘what men or women should be like’). Prescriptive statements are believed to convey 
the normative assumptions underlying gender ideology. Descriptive statements, whilst more 
likely to be predictive of actual behaviour, assess the notion of  gender orientation in their 
focus on individual characteristics (Levant et al. 1992, Thompson et al. 1992). Neither of the 
above propositions has been assessed empirically and as such offer potential areas of enquiry. 
Thompson and Pleck (1995) also suggest the use of the plural as opposed to the singular 
helpfully underlines an awareness of construct multidimensionality (femininities or 
masculinities). 
In sum, measures of gender ideology have successfully addressed many criticisms of 
earlier gender measurement, in particular the lack of importance afforded to construct 
independence and multidimensionality. That is to say, they have developed the notion of 
construct independence, beyond that which was achieved by later orientation measures, by 
suggesting that all forms of gender comparison should be avoided. This is most commonly 
seen in their use of absolute gender characteristics. Additionally ideological measures have 
been the first to achieve multidimensionality even though early measurement critique 
questioned the dominant conceptualisation of gender as a unidimensional construct. A 
commitment to multidimensional assessment has enabled these instruments to account 
somewhat for the contextual specificity of gender. This is seen in inconsistent and often 
contradictory endorsement of traditional norms at both an individual and group level. Finally 
gender ideology has adopted greater critical awareness surrounding the limitations of gender 
measurement. Specifically this has involved the careful definition of masculinity and 
femininity and has relied far more on a theoretically guided process in instrument 
development. The Male Role Norms Inventory-Revised (MRNI-R) (Levant, Smalley, 
Aupont, House, Richmond and Noronha 2007) provides a recent example. This measure 
underwent initial a validation by means of a student sample (n = 170) in the United States. It 
is meant to assess endorsement of traditional masculinity ideology through appraisal of a total 
(‘MRNI-R Total Scale’) and seven subscale scores (i.e., ‘Avoidance of Femininity’, ‘Fear 
and Hatred of Homosexuals’, ‘Extreme Self-Reliance’, ‘Aggression’, Dominance’, ‘Non-
relational Sexuality’, ‘Restrictive Emotionality’).The discussion above has outlined two 
distinct approaches to measuring gender as an individual phenomenon: gender orientation 
and gender ideology. These are grounded in different measurement approaches, distinguished 
as assessing either individual traits or social norms, and informed by the two broad paradigms 
underpinning gender role theory. This paper argues that a third distinct approach to 
measuring gender as a social phenomenon – the gender (re)presentation  approach – might 
beneficially be adopted. This approach, its underlying theoretical rationale of social 
constructionism, its measurement implications, and benefits, are described below. 
Theoretical rationale of measuring gender as a social phenomenon 
Social constructionism, which is grounded in broader postmodernist theorising, has 
increasingly informed gender theorising. Epistemologically it asserts“that ‘facts’ are always 
dependent on the particular forms of language and the particular language communities 
which have created and maintained them” and therefore we “cannot ‘know’ the external 
world”, or, through behavioural inference, the internal world, “because all knowledge is 
mediated by… the specificities of language” (Wilkinson 2001, p. 24). 
Pleck (1995, p. 22) argues that the gender beliefs paradigm is ‘in a broad sense, a 
social constructionist perspective that simply predated the term’ Yet this reflects 
misunderstanding. Social constructionism recognises gender as relatively flexibly 
(re)produced through situated interaction, mediated by language and other shared symbolic 
systems, rather than an internalised individual attribute. 
Rubin’s (1975) valuable distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, which differentiates 
between the socio-culturally defined ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ and biologically defined 
‘female’ and ‘male’, acts as a useful starting point for discussion. Numerous authors have 
considered the relationship between these two concepts (Deaux 1985, Unger and Crawford 
1993, Diamond 2000, Pryzgoda and Chrisler 2000) and the extent to which they are compatible 
with social constructionist theorising. It is claimed that these categories are  not able to account 
for observed variability in gender practices over context and time. Neither gender (Williams 
1987) nor sex (Fausto-Sterling 1993) necessarily appear as dichotomous. West and 
Zimmerman (1987) suggest the sex/gender distinction ought to be expanded in order to 
distinguish between the notions of ‘sex’, ‘sex category’ and ‘gender’: Sex is defined on the 
basis of socio-culturally agreed upon biological/physiological characteristics. An individual’s 
normative allocation to a sex category – such as male or female – depends upon their possessing 
suitable characteristics. In daily life individuals are not allocated to such categories on the basis 
of these agreed upon characteristics, but rather through an appraisal of their gendered social 
practices. These social practices may be understood as embodying an individual’s gender. They 
are guided by dominant gender representations that suggest what practices are appropriate for 
members of each sex category. Individuals reinforce their membership to specific sex 
categories through adopting appropriate social practices. 
Thus social constructionists recognise that sex categories act as primary organising 
principles in society but challenge the notion that these are an objective reality. ‘Sex, like 
gender, draws meaning from shifting cultural understandings and ever-changing social 
practices’ (Marecek et al. 2004, p. 207). ‘Sex’ is nothing more than socio-culturally agreed 
upon biological/physiological characteristics. Likewise individuals do not ‘have gender’. It 
does not exist as an individual attribute, characteristic or trait. Rather it is considered a 
product of situated interaction. Individuals are therefore seen to ‘do gender’ (West and 
Zimmerman 1987). They constantly lay claim to specific sex categorisation through social 
practices. At the same time they also (re)produce meanings concerning what it is to be a 
women or man in society (Bohan 1993).  
Social constructionism stresses the importance of understanding gender as a situated 
social practice. This accounts for its observed variability within and across contexts. 
Prescriptions and proscriptions concerning gender differ from situation to situation. In order 
to ‘do gender’ successfully individuals are required to adapt their practices in accordance 
with these subtle situational demands (Bohan 1993). Individuals always remain accountable 
for their practices in that these are open to social appraisal. They are aware of this fact and 
consider how their practices may be judged through salient socio-cultural standards before 
undertaking them. Constant accountability ensures ‘doing gender’, whether socially 
acceptable or not, is unavoidable (West and Zimmerman 1987). Individuals who fail to do 
gender appropriately are likely to experience negative consequences (Bohan 1993) whereas 
appropriate gender practices confers a sense of social competence (West and Zimmerman 
1987) as well as possilble material reward. 
‘Doing gender’ largely reinforces dominant representations concerning what 
constitutes appropriate gender practice. In doing so, it also legitimates socio-cultural 
arrangements that are based on these meanings (West and Zimmerman 1987). This stresses 
the close relationship between systems of knowledge and power. Gender is constructed in 
such a way so as to perpetuate women’s subordination in society (Flax 1987). 
Empirical evidence supports the social constructionist argument of gender, 
demonstrating variation in its socio-culutural  (such as Luyt 2012a) and situated practice 
(such as Stokoe 1998). Thus, as  Beall (1993) argues, cross-cultural research provides 
especially firm evidence (). But so too does more micro-level analysis of human interaction. 
This theoretical perspective is able to account for variability in gender practices through its 
emphasis on context. It recognises that gender is in no way essential or enduring. Men and 
women may supposedly choose to adopt any form of practice. Crucially, however, in 
everyday life this choice is restricted through ideological and structural constraints. Social 
constructionism nevertheless underlines the radical extent to which individual as well as 
social change may be possible (Bohan 1993). 
Some social constructionists raise concerns regarding the use of quantitative 
measurement for the purpose of gender research. These criticisms may be categorised as 
emanating from either a weak or strong/strict constructionism. They are particularly damning 
of normative measures of gender.  
Weak constructionism argues phenomena acquire different meanings depending upon 
their interpretation within specific socio-cultural contexts (Wilkinson 2001). These 
phenomena are believed to exist independently outside of interpretation. They therefore act to 
limit potential meaning as well as human action. Social constructions are also not merely 
considered fleeting or transient. This implies that sweeping change is unlikely to occur over 
the short term. Traditional research objectives such as theory testing and empirical 
generalisation may therefore remain worthwhile (Stryker 1995). 
Critics from this perspective suggest quantitative measurement ]objectifies, and hence 
potentially reifies gender, as well as universalises related experience. Yet this paper, which 
supports quantitative measurement as informed by social constructionism, argues that any use 
of linguistic categories unavoidably objectifies reality and makes possible its reification 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966). This is the case in both quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
Normative measures are also argued to oppose the assumption of universality through their 
emphasis on multidimensionality. This is partially able to account for contradiction and 
complexity in attitudes toward traditional gender norms. Yet Thompson and Pleck (1995, p. 
135) note that some still claim that ‘these scales still assume one monolithic male role, albeit 
with component dimensions’ (). However there are two further ways through which to 
counter such universalism. Researchers should be prepared to evaluate evidence of an 
instrument’s content validity as well as construct validity among the population in which it is 
to be disseminated and re-evaluate this evidence across time. This is rarely undertaken 
(McHugh and Frieze 1997). When it is, in a cross-cultural context, this may result in separate 
measures being developed. Although such an eventuality ‘complicates or totally eliminates 
the possibility of cross-group comparisons’ (Floyd and Widaman 1995, p. 295) it still 
provides a worthwhile quantitative means with which to describe cross-cultural endorsement 
of traditional gender norms. 
Strong or strict constructionism suggests a far more radical ontological position. 
Meanings assigned to phenomena are believed to be constructed. However, so too are the 
phenomena themselves, which are ‘brought into existence precisely by the discourse that 
presumes to ‘describe’ them’ (Bohan 2002, p. 75). It is argued that a reality independent of 
interpretation either does not exist or cannot be known. As such there is no objective way or 
method through which to judge the ‘truth’ between competing claims concerning the world 
(Stryker 1995, Wilkinson 2001). A strong/strict constructionist critique is evident in the 
argument presented by, for example, discursive psychology. The concept of attitudes and its 
measurement is the focus of especially stinging criticism (Potter 1996, 1998, Wiggins and 
Potter 2003). This paper claims that traditional assumptions underlying the concept may be 
reformulated, and in so doing, make it theoretically and methodologically congruent with 
strict constructionist perspectives. One such possible reformulation is briefly described 
below. Table 1 summarises the three approaches to measuring gender and their theoretical 
assumptions. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The ‘gender (re)presentation’ approach to measurement 
The concept of attitudes is central to the normative approach to measuring gender as an 
individual phenomenon. It has also featured prominently in social psychological debate for 
most of its history (Potter and Wetherell 2001a). For these reasons, the gender 
(re)presentation approach to measurement will be introduced through its critique and 
reformulation. 
Despite its prevalence, it is difficult to locate an all-encompassing definition of the 
concept as its meaning has shifted over time (Potter and Wetherell 2001a). Schwartz and 
Bohner (2001) note early definitions of attitudes stressed that they remained stable and were 
closely related to behaviour. More recent definitions have emphasised their evaluative nature. 
These argue an attitude is expressed when an individual situates an object of thought along 
dimensions of evaluative judgement. Or, in simpler terms, an attitude is expressed when a 
person evaluates a perceived phenomenon either positively or negatively to varying degrees. 
The expression of an attitude is considered to represent an internal, pre-formed and stable 
mental state (Billig 1998a, 1998b). That is to say, attitudes cannot be observed directly, but 
only through the assessment of self-reports or behaviour (Schwartz and Bohner 2001). This 
explanation of attitudes is compatible with the notion of gender ideology. As is noted above, 
measures of gender ideology are commonly described as assessing individual ‘endorsement 
and internalisation of cultural belief systems about… gender’ (Pleck 1995, p. 19). 
Discursive psychologists reject the traditional conceptualisation of attitudes. In 
particular it is argued that their stability is overstated. They point toward the fact individuals 
may not express an evaluation in exactly the same way across, as well as within, situations 
(Potter and Wetherell 2001a). Such variability in attitudes proves problematic for traditional 
perspectives seeking to demonstrate the existence of stable underlying mental constructs 
(Potter 1998). Schwartz and Bohner (2001) note that self-reported attitudes appear somewhat 
context dependent. Traditional perspectives account for variability in two main ways: stable 
attitudes are seen to exist, where varying responses are merely seen to reflect measurement 
error due to the influence of changing situational variables; or, relatively stable attitudes 
exist, but individuals access either a range of memory structures or multiple attitudes about 
an object, when responding to questions. 
It is nonetheless claimed that these explanations do not sufficiently account for 
observed variability as is seen in the analysis of social interaction. Evaluations are not seen to 
reflect some internal, pre-formed and stable mental state, but are rather believed to be 
situation dependent. It has been suggested that attitudes be described as evaluative 
judgements that are made solely on the basis of situationally accessible information 
(Schwartz and Bohner 2001). Discursive psychology extends this line of argument. 
Individuals are argued to draw on available discursive resources in order to make evaluations. 
Furthermore, when individuals make evaluations they are seen to be doing something, or 
more precisely performing an action. This implies individuals make attitude claims for 
specific purposes within any situation. Attitudes are therefore best re-conceptualised as 
evaluative practices serving particular functions (Potter 1998, Potter and Wetherell 2001a). 
It is commonly argued that this re-conceptualisation makes the use of quantitative 
measures inappropriate. It is only supposedly in applying cognitive assumptions, which stress 
the importance of internal mental states as opposed to social interaction, that warrant their use 
(Potter 1998). In particular, Potter and Wetherell (2001a) note the core assumption in 
traditional theory; that attitudes are clearly separate from the ‘object of thought’. A 
questionnaire item serves as the object of thought in attitude measurement. Participants are 
asked to reflect upon the item in order to express their attitude. Assessment of attitudes held 
by different individuals is made possible because objects of thought are believed to hold the 
same meaning for all. Most discursive psychologists disagree. They argue that attitude 
measurement is meaningless because ‘the object is formulated and constructed in discourse in 
the course of doing evaluation’ (p. 207), or to paraphrase, that the object only acquires 
meaning through the specific interaction in which the individual is asked to make the 
evaluation. 
Discursive psychology suggests evaluative practices are most suitably explored 
through an analysis of social interaction. Potter (1998, p. 242) underlines the perspective. He: 
 …treats action as fundamental or, as Schegloff (1995) puts it, omnirelevant. So if you want to 
understand evaluations you need to consider carefully what people are doing with them in 
their ‘home’ environments, rather than in the more arcane contexts of filling in attitude scales. 
The extract reveals the extent to which the critique concerning the use of attitude 
measurement is largely based on a preference for bottom-up as opposed to top-down 
approaches to discourse analysis (Edley and Wetherell 1997). The bottom-up approach is 
informed by the work of theorists such as Sacks (1964-1965/1992) and Garfinkel (1967). 
Fine-grained analysis of textual features is undertaken in order to describe the action-
orientation of social interaction (Edley and Wetherell 1997). Austin (1962) was the first to 
identify ‘talk as action’. He argued that language not only carries meaning but also force. 
That is to say, individuals are able to do and achieve things through the use of language. This 
suggests analysis should focus on what individuals are accomplishing through social 
interaction (Potter and Wetherell 2001b). These arguments are evident in Potter’s (1998) 
emphasis on the action-orientation of text (‘action as fundamental’) and his explicit mention 
of a well-known conversation analyst [ ‘Schegloff (1995)’].  
From a bottom-up perspective, which stresses the need for fine-grained or micro-level 
analysis of textual features in order to describe the action-orientation of social interaction, it 
would clearly be unsuitable to make use of scales or questionnaires. However, from a top-
down perspective that explores how individuals are constituted or positioned through 
discourse, these research materials may prove useful. This approach draws heavily on the 
work of theorists such as Foucault (1978) and Marx (1867-1894/1981). It focuses on broad 
concepts such as ideology and power in order to explore how individuals are constituted or 
positioned through discourse (Wooffitt 2005). 
Potter and Wetherell’s (2001a, p. 207 emphasis added) original observation that ‘the 
object is formulated and constructed in discourse in the course of doing evaluation’ reflects a 
bottom-up approach to analysis. Here discourse is characterised as a practice. Questionnaire 
items are not thought to hold a similar meaning for individuals because they are seen to be 
caught within ceaseless discursive debate. It therefore becomes important to understand the 
function of evaluative practices through features of the proximate context (participant 
understanding surrounding the type of conversation to which they are contributing; the 
actions made possible through sequences of talk; and the roles participants are assigned or 
assume). 
Those in favour of a top-down approach to analysis may have alternatively observed 
the object is formulated and constructed by discourse in the course of doing evaluation. Here 
discourse is characterised as an entity. Questionnaire items are thought to hold a similar 
meaning for most members of a socio-cultural group because they are believed to share broad 
systems of meaning. It therefore becomes important to understand the function of evaluative 
practices through features of the distal context (such as participant age, ethnicity, ‘race’ and 
social class; the research site; and the socio-cultural and ecological milieu in which it is 
embedded). Quantitative measures are suited to this task. They allow us to ask a number of 
useful inter- and intra-group questions. For example: are traditional gender norms 
conceptualised differently across socio-cultural groups and are they endorsed to the same 
extent across divisions such as age and social class within these groups? 
In seeking to answer these questions, the gender (re)presentation approach holds a 
number of assumptions concerning features of the research context, which distinguishes it 
from other perspectives. Both traditional research and discursive psychology view 
measurement research environments as problematic.  
In traditional research, these environments are deemed problematic in that they 
introduce potential bias. This is seen, for example, in the concept of social desirability which 
is defined as “the tendency for a person to respond in a way that seems socially appealing, 
regardless of his or her true characteristics” (Furr and Bacharach 2008, p. 246). It is argued 
that we are better able to assess an individual’s ‘true characteristics’ through controlling for 
such bias. 
In discursive psychology, these environments are considered problematic due to their 
claimed artificiality. As noted above, Potter (1998, p. 242) views these as “arcane contexts” 
that are removed from the everyday realities experienced by people in their “‘home’ 
environments”. Individual evaluations in these contexts may serve particular functions but 
these are not especially useful given their alleged remoteness from ordinary life. 
The gender (re)presentation approach, by contrast, does not view measurement 
research environments as problematic but rather as constituting an important and meaningful 
context for data elicitation. They are not seen as introducing bias that clouds our 
apprehension of an individual’s ‘true characteristics’ – as suggested by traditional research. 
Indeed, as a social constructionist approach, ‘true’ individual attributes, characteristics or 
traits are not believed to exist. These are not understood to exist in individual heads but are 
rather a product of social interaction. Nor is the measurement research environment 
considered an artificial setting that is removed from ‘naturally’ occurring social interaction 
and hence superfluous – as suggested by discursive psychology. The research environment in 
which questionnaires  or scales are completed, are considered unique, but no more so than 
any other. This includes our so-called ‘home environments’ that don’t exist ‘naturally’, 
inherently or independently of the social interaction that constitute them. All are equally 
meaningful (Edley and Litosseliti 2010). 
It is important therefore to describe some of the potential meanings that frame 
measurement research environments.  
The gender (re)presentation approach argues that the way these research environments 
are understood by participants is indispensable for the meaningful elicitation and 
interpretation of data. Measures of gender (re)presentation seek to assess endorsement of 
dominant gender representations. It is therefore important that participants complete such 
measures within a research environment characterised by the normative. As described below, 
measures of gender (re)presentation need to exhibit five key characteristics, including 
appropriate content that is specifically tailored to the assessment of dominant gender 
representation. Through the use of, for example, third person statements and prescriptive 
norms, these measures actively encourage partcipants to orient towards these dominant 
discourses and position themselves within them. In this sense, a well crafted measure of 
gender (re)presentation needs to reflect the same discourses of power that structure everyday 
social practices. So, when individuals complete these measures, they are ‘doing gender’ as 
informed by a normative environment. They draw upon features of the distal context, such as 
their perceived group membership, and salient discursive resourses made available by the 
measures, in order to respond in a socially meaningful way. 
In sum, most discursive psychologists argue the concept of attitudes is flawed and 
should be discarded. Potter (1998, p. 241) typifies this stance: 
…it would be easy to give the impression that there are pre-existing objects – attitudes – 
which are understood in one way, or one set of ways, in mainstream social cognition work, 
and then understood in another way in discursive social psychology. However, this would 
understate the degree to which the attitude notion is constituted out of social psychological 
theory, and the extent to which the notion is dissolved in discursive social psychology into a 
range of other considerations. 
This stance is surprising. Recent debate among social psychologists in the United Kingdom, 
in particular, has generated calls for productive engagement between adherents of traditional 
versus critical perspectives [The Psychologist (2005), Vol. 18, provides particularly 
interesting reading in this regard]. The suggestion that the concept of attitudes should be 
‘dissolved’ in the face of discursive critique is not conducive to engagement but rather serves 
to polarise debate. It should be recognised the concept has inhabited a central position in 
social psychological theory. This is unlikely to change. As such it would seem more sensible 
to reformulate it from a discursive perspective. A reformulation of this kind would allow 
discursive psychologists, among other social constructionists, to make use of quantitative 
measures when applying a top-down approach to discourse analysis. This would be in 
keeping with Abell and Walton’s (2010, p. 686) observation that: 
…discursive approaches to social psychology are a very broad church and the members of its 
congregation demonstrate in their empirical investigations dazzling inventiveness in their 
combination of approaches, methods, epistemological, and ontological positions. Further such a 
state of affairs is entirely consistent with the view that what matters is empirical utility rather than 
methodological purity. 
This proves especially helpful when exploring gender at a social or group as opposed to an 
individual level. Through the use of large-group normative data, researchers may gain 
understanding of dominant gender representations, and theorise the functions any variations 
serve within and between socio-cultural groups. Such variations may, in particular, point 
toward possible conflicts and challenges in gender ideology within any given society.  
This paper argues that measures of gender (re)presentation should include five key 
characteristics: an emphasis on multiple masculinities, femininities and other gender practices 
(construct multidimensionality); a clear distinction between masculinity, femininity, and 
other gender-related concepts (construct independence); a focus on social or group level as 
opposed to individual phenomena; and suitable evidence of measurement validity as well as 
theoretically appropriate content. 
Construct multidimensionality is emphasised by measures of gender (re)presentation 
as is the case in measures of gender ideology.  This facilitates a more nuanced and complex 
account of gender attitudes by capturing often inconsistent and contradictory endorsement of 
dominant gender representations where, for example, men of a particular socio-cultural group 
may support traditional notions of masculine success but at the same time distance 
themselves from notions of traditional masculine toughness.  It allows useful inter- and intra-
group comparisons. As noted above, we may be interested in asking whether traditional 
gender representations are conceptualised differently across socio-cultural groups as well as 
whether are they endorsed in a similar fashion across divisions such as age and social class 
within these groups. We might, for instance, discover that working-class men endorse ideas 
of traditional masculine toughness to a greater extent than middle-class men of the same 
socio-cultural group, who by contrast, endorse ideas of traditional masculine success more 
strongly. Lastly, it facilitates our being able to trace changes in the variable endorsement of 
dominant gender representations over time (McHugh and Frieze 2007). We may find, for 
example, working-class men increasingly distance themselves from notions of traditional 
masculine toughness. We could then ultimately theorise the functions any apparent variations 
serve within and between socio-cultural groups. For instance, we might argue men of 
different social classes are most likely to endorse social representations they are able to 
practice most easily, as a means with which to position themselves as ‘real’ men. 
Multidimensionality thus provides a means with which to explore social, political and 
historical variation in gender conceptualisation, and in doing so, highlights difference in 
gender experience. 
Construct independence is of central importance in measures of gender 
(re)presentation as well as gender ideology. Levant et al.’s (1992) observation that measures 
should be developed in order to assess absolute as opposed to relative gender characteristics 
is useful. Absolute gender characteristics typify constructs such as masculinity and femininity 
but do not differentiate between them. This recognises the independence of these constructs 
at both an instrument and item level. That is to say, separate measures should be developed 
for constructs such as masculinity versus femininity representation, and items should avoid 
gender comparison. 
Social constructionists argue gender is something we ‘do’ rather than something we 
‘have’. Exploration of attitudes as an individual level phenomenon is, from this perspective, 
inappropriate. They are not considered to reflect some internal, pre-formed and stable mental 
state. Rather, they are understood as evaluative practices based upon broad shared systems of 
meaning, that serve particular functions. Measures of gender (re)presentation are therefore 
applied in order to understand gender as a social or group level phenomenon. We are 
interested in how gender is constructed in specific socio-cultural contexts by discourse and 
the subjectivities made possible as a result. Dynamism is recognised where the interplay of 
agency and structure allow attitudes to appear both stable and changing, unidimensional and 
multidimensional, but only meaningful when dominant gender representation is understood in 
the same way by a socio-cultural group. 
Variability in gender understanding across context and time demands that we 
carefully obtain evidence in support of an instrument’s measurement validity before making 
use of it. Gibbons, Hamby and Dennis (1997) note most cross-national research makes use of 
an existing measure, for which evidence in support of its reliability and validity in a specific 
cultural context exists (most frequently the United States), and applies this to a new cultural 
context. All too often such measures are applied among populations for which there is no 
such evidence. At best this implies a false universalism or an imposed etic in gender 
experience; one that is for the most part ‘white’, Western and middle-class. At worst it 
reflects nothing more than idle research practice. As noted above, researchers should be 
prepared to evaluate evidence of an instrument’s content as well as construct validity among 
the population in which it is to be disseminated. A mixed method approach, drawing upon the 
strengths of both qualitative and quantitative techniques, should ideally be adopted in order to 
do so (Luyt 2012b). In cross-cultural research, for example, the equivalence of measures 
should not be assumed. Measurement validation procedures should always be undertaken. 
Qualitative methods, such as focus groups, may be useful in assessing a measure’s content 
validity. The cross-cultural meaningfulness of items can be determined. In particular, the 
constructs they operationalise as well as the settings (such as higher education) and tasks 
(such as asking someone on a date) they describe, ought to be considered carefully (Gibbons 
et al. 1997). This may indicate the useful addition or removal of culture specific constructs 
(Gibbons et al. 1997) or that separate emic measures should be developed for use within 
different socio-cultural contexts. Where justified, we should be tolerant of so called ‘scale 
proliferation’ (McHugh and Frieze 1997, p. 2). It is recognised developing equivalent 
measures may neither be possible nor necessarily desirable due to differences in gender 
understanding across such contexts. This may complicate cross-cultural comparison. Yet a far 
richer, albeit more complex, set of findings may result. For example, replicatory or 
confirmatory factor analysis might indicate cross-cultural equivalence of some but not all 
underlying constructs. In such cases, comparisons would be limited to constructs 
demonstrating sufficient equivalence. Gibbons et al. (1997) also suggest analysis of 
individual items as opposed to total scores may be helpful in such circumstances. 
Finally, measures of gender (re)presentation need to include appropriate content that is 
specifically tailored to the assessment of social representations. As in the case of measures of 
gender ideology, this includes the use of third person statements; prescriptive norms ( ‘what 
women or men should be like’ as opposed to ‘what women or men are like); and the use of the 
plural as a means to highlight construct multidimensionality (femininities or masculinities as 
opposed to femininity or masculinity) (Thompson and Pleck 1995). The importance of theory 
in guiding measurement development is clearly evident. Table 2 summarises the three 
approaches to measuring gender and their measurement assumptions. 
[Table 2 about here] 
This paper suggests social constructionism may inform a novel approach to measuring 
gender, beyond that already offered by the gender orientation and gender ideology approach; 
this known as the gender (re)presentation approach. Measures of gender (re)presentation 
share an emphasis on the independence and multidimensionality of gender with measures of 
gender ideology. Yet they may alternatively be said index the extent to which groups endorse 
dominant gender representations, which serve to legitimate and (re)produce unequal gender 
relations, and in so doing make specific gender subject positions available. Gender is not 
understood as an internalised identity. It is alternatively understood as a social practice made 
meaningful through shared representations held by members of the same social group. 
Interest therefore lies in its measurement at a group or social rather than individual level. This 
serves to compliment fine-grained or micro-level situated analysis where individuals are seen 
to strategically adopt varying gender practices and claim subject positions in the course of 
unfolding social interaction. 
It may be argued that this paper offers an alternative interpretative lens through which 
to view existing measures rather than an entirely new approach to gender measurement. Yet 
an argument of this kind would fail to appreciate the important relationship between theory 
and method as outlined above. Measurement assumptions change only gradually across 
different approaches to measuring gender (see Figure 2). But these are informed by 
underlying theoretical assumptions that contrast more starkly (see Figure 1). This is 
especially so when comparing the gender (re)presentation approach against existing 
approaches. Its theoretically informed claim, that gender should only be measured at a group 
or social level, signifies a radical departure from traditional psychological thinking. It offers 
the potential that gender measurement may appeal to those working outside the confines of 
traditional Psychology where gender is more readily understood as a social as opposed to an 
individual level phenomenon. This brings, in particular, the benefit of large-group normative 
data. The challenge now exists to develop adequate measures of gender (re)presentation. It is 
hoped this paper serves as a foundation. 
  
Table 1. Approaches to measuring gender and their theoretical assumptions 
 
  APPROACHES TO MEASURING GENDER 
  Gender Orientation Gender Ideology Gender Representation 
TH
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S 
Epistemological Perspective Positivism Positivism Constructionism 
Theoretical Perspective Gender Role Theory (Gender Role Identity Paradigm) 
Gender Role Theory (Gender 
Role Beliefs Paradigm) Social Constructionism 
Gender assessed as… …an individual trait …internalised individual attitudes toward social norms 
…as a  subject position 
relative to dominant gender 
representations 
Gender reducible to the… …individual …individual …social 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Approaches to measuring gender and their measurement assumptions 
 
  APPROACHES TO MEASURING GENDER  
  Gender Orientation Gender Ideology Gender Representation 
M
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SU
R
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EN
T 
A
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M
PT
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N
S 
Construct dependence interdependent/independent independent independent 
Construct dimensionality unidimensional multidimensional multidimensional 
Cross-cultural measurement 
equivalence possible and desirable possible and desirable 
often impossible as well as 
undesirable 
Item characteristics 
absolute/relative absolute absolute 
1st person 3rd person 3rd person 
descriptive stereotype prescriptive norm prescriptive norm 
Level of analysis individual/group individual/group group 
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